An Open Letter to Prime Minister Hariri

Published in Ya Libnan and Beirut-Online

Your Excellency:

Congratulations on the formation of the new cabinet. Now that you have a government in place, I am writing to advise you to capitalize on recent developments to set the stage for peace in Lebanon.

Significant incidents in the South and recent Israeli threats indicate that Israel and Hezbollah are preparing for a confrontation. A new war would far supersede the devastation and destruction inflicted in 2006. This underscores the urgency of acting fast to partner with Hezbollah. Domestically, you should engage Hezbollah and work with the U.S. and the international community on an incentive package that encourages the party to give up loyalty to Syria and Iran, surrender its weapons, and fully integrate into Lebanese politics. Concurrently, you should leverage developments in Syrian-American relations to cut off Hezbollah’s weapon supply.

Your Excellency, now is the time to act. America’s rapprochement with Syria presents an opportunity for Lebanon. But you should act fast to be a player in the process, working closely with the U.S. to prevent Lebanon from being used as a bargaining chip.

Situation: Israeli threat is imminent

Renewed conflict with Israel is probable. Activity along the border has increased, and Israel’s threats have soared in frequency and gravity. Hezbollah’s Katyusha launch into Israel on October 27 was the ninth serious incident since the 2006 war. Ever since the Kherbet Slim episode in July, Israel has held “all Lebanese” responsible “for any Hezbollah activity.” In addition, Israeli spying activities have increased, and the rate at which they are being exposed could provide Hezbollah the casus belli for a provocation. To make matters worse, the reported seize of arms shipment from Iran to Syria on November 3 is being advertised by Israel as the largest cache of smuggled weapons ever to be seized. Netanyahu called for the international community to “back Israel when it defends itself.” Israel could be laying the groundwork to justify a near-future strike to finish its 2006 war or to fight a proxy war with Iran.

In what follows, I elaborate on the proposed strategy:

Capitalize on improved Syrian-American relations

Recent developments in Syrian-American relations bode well. Syria is reciprocating America’s outreach earlier this year with a visit to Washington last month by Fayssal Mekdad, the highest ranking official to visit in five years. Syrian-Israeli peace talks are also likely to resume. On October 28, President Al-Assad voiced his support for resuming talks; Ehud Barak responded that peace with Syria was “a central brick in any stable regional arrangement.” Last Friday, Al-Assad called for French efforts to support Turkish mediation between Israel and Syria.

Privately, you should emphasize to the Americans that Syria does not want to be stuck on the Shiite side of the Sunni-Shia divide and U.S. rapprochement with Syria would stabilize the region. You should act fast to be a partner in the process to ensure that Lebanon's interests are not dismissed. In a presentation to the U.S. Congress on October 28, Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman reaffirmed that there will be no return to the pre-1990s era where Washington bargained at Lebanon's expense. Nevertheless, this is a risk we cannot take.

Engage Hezbollah

This is where you should focus most of your efforts.

Disarming and fully integrating Hezbollah has to be achieved through a political process led by the Lebanese State. Initiate a private dialogue with Hassan Nasrallah to truly understand Hezbollah’s demands and its core aspirations. As the recent past has taught us, any attempt to undermine or confront the movement is counterproductive, and supporting alternative Shia movements is futile. Even if its Syrian lifeline is interrupted, Hezbollah would remain powerful. If cornered, it could direct its arsenal inward, igniting a civil war. Your negotiation efforts should be private. Refrain from publically criticizing the movement. If Hezbollah is to disarm, mechanisms should be set in place for the party to save face.

You should persuade the U.S. that there is no alternative to engaging Hezbollah, and that the first step is to acknowledge the party as a legitimate player. Fighting Israel is not fundamental to Hezbollah’s ideology. Since inception, the movement has significantly evolved. It has publically rejected Iranian-style Islamization of Lebanon, a pillar of its1985 manifesto. Similarly, it has abandoned the destruction of Israel as a goal and reorganized as a Lebanese resistance. Given the right circumstances, Hezbollah would renounce violence against Israel. To make any headway, the U.S. must appreciate the diversity of Hezbollah's religious, political, and social ties with its supporters. Mutual symbolic gestures would go a long way: the U.S. would take Hezbollah off its terrorist list, and in return Hezbollah would apologize for the 1983 bombing. There is reason to believe that America might realize the pragmatism of working with Hezbollah. The Obama administration has started to strike a balance between American values and American interests. Case in point, the U.S. now has plans to work with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

With the help of the U.S. and the international community, offer Hezbollah a package of economic and political incentives. You should strike a balance between incentives that are attractive enough to entice Hezbollah to integrate but that still preserve Lebanon’s multi-confessional identity. Political incentives can vary from increasing the Shia quota defined by the Ta’if Accord to abolishing confessionalism. Some of the options will require structural modifications to our political system, but difficult compromises need to be made in return for peace.

There is also the question of Palestinian refugees. As long as the refugees, predominantly Sunni, remain in Lebanon, Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm. You should mobilize U.S. support for resolving the refugee dilemma. Make it clear that no peace can be had otherwise and that Israel would reap the benefits of a solution, given the link between refugee conditions and extremism. Lead the call for an international scheme that would compensate refugees and relocate them to the West Bank or Gaza or offer them citizenship in large, developed countries, or a combination of both.

Challenge: regional developments largely beyond our control

It is not clear to what extent Syria will be at the forefront of the American agenda. President Obama is currently overwhelmed with domestic issues, Afghanistan, and Iran. The situation with Iran is fragile. It appears that Iran has not accepted the nuclear fuel deal from the October 1 Geneva talks. If negotiations fail, thanks to Russia’s recent cooperation sanctions are likely to be tightened, followed by military intervention as Iran is one year away from a nuclear bomb. Israel, however, will be tempted to strike preemptively. Any military altercation with Iran—American or Israeli—would plunge Lebanon into a proxy war. This further underscores the urgency of integrating Hezbollah.

This is a long-term strategy. Making progress against it requires favorable regional developments that are beyond our control, including Syria’s relations with the West, Iranian negotiations, and Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. But as Obama’s strategy in the Middle East takes shape, you should continuously work in concert with the U.S. to steer developments in Lebanon’s interest.

Your Excellency, we now have a chance at peace. We should not repeat the mistakes of the past when peace slipped through our hands because we were too slow to act.

Twenty Years Later, Little Has Changed

Published in Ya Libnan and Beirut-Online

Twenty years ago this month, on November 4 1989, the civil war ended with the ratification of the Taif Accord. This reconciliation agreement identified the elimination of confessionalism as a national priority. The constitution was amended to uphold “the abolition of political confessionalism” as “a basic national goal.” It did not, however, provide a timeframe or framework to go about substituting this system of governance. Today, Lebanon remains a confessional state.

Whether seeking to marry or applying for a job, the first question is always what religious confession you belong to. To the untrained ear, this may sound jarring, but that is the reality of our society, a reality that is reinforced by the current political framework. Despite the Taif Accord, the country remains mired in political inertia and suffers from an inability to institute much needed reforms in its political structure.

Lebanon naturally converged to confessionalism in the 1926 constitution as a means to protect the identity of its diverse communities and provide a balance of power. In theory, the confessional system enables the peaceful co-existence of religious communities by distributing political posts “proportionally” according to each community’s demographic weight. Proponents insist that with no group constituting a majority in Lebanon, representation of every confession should be guaranteed.

I beg to differ.

The case against confessionalism

One of the fathers of the Lebanese constitution, Michel Chiha, once wrote:

"[Confessionalism] is not perfect but it is the most suitable…solution for all of us as minorities in the country. But we should be very careful: confessional politics must remain inside the Parliament for if one decides to resign, then the confessional tensions will be taken over to the streets, which can …result in destabilization."
Chiha understood the theoretical strength of confessionalism—the protection of the country’s 18 disparate minorities—but underestimated the disruptive incentives that are bred by its politics. More than 70 years ago, Chiha further stipulated that a secular solution could be found once the Lebanese are “mature” enough. This begs the question: when will the Lebanese be mature enough? Isn’t a 15-year civil war a strong enough indicator that it is time to turn the page on sectarianism?

What about the vicious cycle perpetuated by a confessional framework? The more entrenched the Lebanese are in a confessional society, the more solidified their prejudices become, and the harder it is to foment national unity that transcends ethnic communities. Confessionalism deepens sectarian differences by encouraging allegiance to one’s ethnic group over the state. Dependencies within one’s confession are emphasized: religious institutions exercise control over many facets of life, such as marriage and inheritance. Indirect controls and clannish clientelism are also plentiful: jobs, housing, and education are often obtained through appeals to confessional political representatives. This incubates “states” within the state.

The delicate confessional balance makes the state extremely sensitive to internal and external stressors. Minor changes in the political environment from demographic or foreign manipulation trigger instability. There have been several attempts at artificially bloating population numbers of specific communities to gain greater political representation. For instance, in the 1950s, President Chamoun naturalized Christian Palestinians, seeking to boost the number of Lebanese Christians. Similarly, in 1994, a naturalization decree attempted to bolster the Sunni population.

Demographic changes further exacerbate the situation. The proportional share of power, a central tenet of confessionalism, has to reflect the demographic reality in the country. As demographics change, power held by a particular confession no longer reflects the relative size of that group. A Christian majority in the 1932 census was the underpinning of a structure that gave Christians greater representation. As the century progressed and as the Sunni and Shiite populations increased relative to Christians, the latter were wielding a disproportionate amount of power. Sectarian rifts exploded. The Taif recalibrated representation, primarily in favor of Sunnis. Twenty years on, Christians and Shiites feel bitterly underrepresented, and the emerging regional Sunni-Shiite divide further aggravates the dangers of the frail system. How long before the eruption of a new calibrating war?

The path forward

A sustainable nation depends on the development of common interests across its communities. Much of life in Lebanon, however, is still organized according to religious affiliation, and sectarian rivalries run deep. Though the Green Line no longer exists as a physical demarcation in Beirut, it is engrained in the minds of the Lebanese. Many wonder: could civil war return? The crisis in May of 2008, when Hezbollah overpowered government forces, is a testimony that much work is needed in turning the page. Confessionalism should be abandoned.

There are challenges nonetheless. Public opinion is expectedly divided along sectarian lines. With changing demographics, former critics of confessionalism have become its protagonists, while its former advocates are now its opponents. Shiite Muslims, with their plurality of the population, view their powers diminished compared to what they would exercise under a majority rule. Previously secularized Christians, on the other hand, are now fearful of the rising power of the Shiites and, as a result, are more willing to accept the confessionalized status quo. Given the nature of the system, there will probably never be unanimous agreement on the issue.

It is clear however that the Lebanese are not ready for a swift riddance. A recent survey by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee (LOAC) found that more than 50% of Lebanese across the board agreed that political confessionalism is rooted in Lebanese culture and cannot be removed. The secularization process should therefore be gradual and inclusive. Parliament should put forth a transition plan. Under its oversight, a national taskforce comprising of leading political, intellectual, and religious figures would be created to examine the situation. The taskforce would then present proposals for a sustainable, secular framework that upholds meritocracy and purges religious discrimination. Article 12 of the Constitution stipulates that, “no preference [should be] made except on the basis of merit and competence.” Indeed, merit should be the only criterion for political office.

A bicameral transition government would then be formed—one chamber based on the current confessional framework, the other elected without confessional quotas. The relationship between the two chambers would be defined by the taskforce recommendation. They would work jointly—and serve as a check-and-balance for each other—on a strategy for national reconciliation to reaffirm the Lebanese identity. The education system would be reformed to promote national unity. Horizontal interests and a secular electoral law would be espoused. If needed, the interim government could serve multiple terms for substantial legislative reforms to be instituted.

The path to a sustainable Lebanon is long, but possible. Ironically, Michel Chiha once wrote: “a nation is a guarantee for confessions, but confessions are not a guarantee to the nation.” These words could not ring more loudly today.

Pity the Expat

Published in Naharnet, Ya Libnan, and Beirut-Online

This summer was a remarkable one for Lebanon. Through prevailing peace and the return of many native sons and daughters, Lebanon seemed to be experiencing renaissance.

Behind this rebirth lies a sobering reality. As September drew to an end, most of the thousands of young expats that flocked to Lebanon for the summer left the country. Like me, the expat returns to his life in a land far away. Though envied by his compatriots at home for the generous opportunities in richer and more stable countries, this Lebanese silently suffers. His prize is economic opportunity. The cost, however, is separation from loved ones and from a place he calls home.

An estimated 20,000-40,000 Lebanese leave the country of 4 million every year. Most are students or young professionals seeking what Lebanon fails to offer: economic opportunities in a stable environment. A lot has been said about the effect of brain drain on the country, but few think about the plight of the emigrating youth. They too suffer as a result of their ambitions. Most would prefer to remain with loved ones, yet they end up aliens abroad.

For the young expat, the dilemma is painstakingly familiar: he sits at the airport waiting for a connecting flight to Europe or America, wondering whether he is committing a huge mistake. Is it worth leaving his people, his culture, and his family behind in search for opportunity? This is not his first time leaving home. In fact, he has been shuttling back and forth for many years now. Yet he cannot explain why his throat still throbs and why he has to fight back tears each time he leaves. Though surrounded by many, he is completely alone.

The emigrant's plight is a tale of schizophrenia. For years, he attempts to integrate into the new culture. Though he now shares experiences with his new cohort, he lacks a shared sense of identity. On many an occasion, he is reminded that he is an outsider, an alien. Meanwhile, as he acclimates to the norms of the host country, he becomes rusty with the customs of his native home. He has one foot abroad, one foot at home. Neither is enough to ground him anywhere. In essence, he becomes an outsider in both countries. That is the "dissociative" state of being torn between two places.

The irony is that the emigrant knows his clock is ticking. The longer he stays abroad, the harder it is for him to return home. The opportunity cost of leaving everything behind soars, and the risks rise. It becomes difficult to forego his professional standing, which he sacrificed so much to achieve, for an outcome that is uncertain. Lebanon's political instability clouds his opportunity for decent economic gain. He could accept a mediocre job or start something from scratch. The risk of failure, however, is high as dictated by a fragile and primitive business environment. There is also no guarantee that his experience abroad will be of any use at home. Lebanon thus becomes a bittersweet memory, an ache in his heart.

The emigrant's struggles are further exacerbated by the stigma of carrying the Lebanese passport. In the new world order defined by the events of September 11, the Lebanese migrant is less than welcomed by custom officials in Western countries. In American airports, he is labeled "special registrant," which entails additional searches, longer waits, and inquisitive cross examinations by unwelcoming and sometimes disrespectful officers. As the West evaluates its immigration policies, the Lebanese emigrant continues to struggle to find a new home in lands that seem to no longer welcome him.

Who is to blame for the struggles of the young emigrant? The home country for creating the conditions for emigration? Globalization for making the process easier? Or the emigrant's own ambitions for wanting what was not offered at home?

While the answer is probably a combination of all three, this reality, ultimately, is a plea to our politicians. In the new rounds of negotiations, may they genuinely attempt to form a government that maintains a seeming perception of political stability. The slightest efforts in that direction could create economic opportunities that obliterate much of the conditions for emigration and encourage émigrés to return. May their conscience remind them that young souls the age of their sons and daughters are being forced to leave their loved ones every day. They are the foregone future leaders that Lebanon so desperately needs. Their struggle is the country's struggle. Their loss of a homeland is the country's loss of its future.