Published on the Harvard Business School website.
The United States has no vital national interest in Libya; yet there is a good case for intervention. First, the international community asked for it. With unprecedented speed, the United Nations authorized it, and with unprecedented unity, the Arab League urged that action be taken against a fellow Arab government.
Second, there was little doubt about Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's intentions. Residents of the city of Benghazi were to feel his wrath, as a preamble to ferocious atrocities to follow.
Third, there is much to learn from history. Take Rwanda and Bosnia as two contrasting examples. In 1994, President Bill Clinton and French President Francois Mitterrand chose not intervene in Rwanda. The aftermath was the extermination of 20% of Rwanda's population. In 1995, on the other hand, the US put an end to mass rape and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In neither case did the US have a vital interest, but Clinton intervened in Bosnia on moral grounds while the British and French hid behind the banner of a "civil war." America saved the day.
Experience with another maniacal autocrat also provides valuable learning. After forcing Saddam Hussein's army out of Kuwait in the first Gulf War, Bush Senior watched as Hussein massively smashed Kurdish and Shia uprisings in the north and south of Iraq, killing more than 100,000 of his own citizens.
President Obama, therefore, is right in his decision to intervene in Libya, but he is wrong in giving up leadership of the operation to NATO. Without the US, NATO is severely limited in weapons and experience. Even if it succeeds in deposing Qaddafi, the task will not end there. It is impossible to imagine a new Libyan government that independently patches itself together and provides security to its citizens. More likely, lawlessness and tribal tensions will ensue. The West should not have intervened without a strategy. A half-baked effort may inflict more damage than no effort at all.
Obama is adopting a case-by-case approach. It is unimaginable that he will support upheaval in the Arabian Gulf. Much more is at stake there, economically and geopolitically. Even a restless Syria poses a serious challenge. Despite the trauma from the 1982 Hama crackdown, the uprising in Syria is gathering momentum. With real consequences to Iran and Israel, a Syrian approach would demand the most creativity.
But just because the US won't intervene in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain does not invalidate the case for intervention elsewhere. Doing good when pragmatic is more important than the consistency of a clear doctrine. The downside, however, to a pragmatic approach is that Arabs in the midst of unsupported revolutions would not forget that America did not walk the talk in their moment of greatest need.
The Arab world is in transition. Outcomes will be mixed, but Arabs have rediscovered their humanity. Decades of forced servitude had left them lethargic. Now they know they can flutter their wings. The next decade will undoubtedly be difficult, but Arabs can at least get a shot at self–determination. And that is priceless.
